Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1986

Lawmaking as an Expression of Self
George P. Fletcher
Columbia Law School, gpfrecht@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George P. Fletcher, Lawmaking as an Expression of Self, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 201 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3791

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

LAWMAKING AS AN EXPRESSION OF SELF
George P. Fletc~

We now take it as common ground that different economic and
social circumstances generate different legal cultures. If a natural
resource like water or oil is vital to the local economy, one would
expect the emergence of legal rules and institutions to protect that
resource against depletion. If people are interested in surviving,
they will take measures to ensure their survival. On the social
plane, if an institution such as friendship or the family is regarded
as central, this commitment is likely to generate rules protecting
the institution. Of course, the correlation between social forces and
legal rules might not be precise. It might be the case, for example, that as family values decline, the rules of divorce remain strict
as an expression of yearnings for times past. And if family values
reassert themselves against a background of loose divorce rules,
the law might not revert to its former strictness. If a social movement is deeply rooted, the law might indeed appear irrelevant as
an instrument for guarding and furthering that movement.
As a general ·proposition, we can hardly quarrel with Holmes'
aphorism that the life of the law has not been logic, but experience.1
The felt necessities of the time induce courts and legislatures to
change the governing rules. So much is clear. The matter becomes
murky, however, if we dig behind this platitude and we attempt
to be more precise about the relationship between the base of
economic and social circumstances and the superstructure of legal
rules. The argument is that the base in some way generates or
brings about the superstructure. Unfortunately, this causal proposition verges on truth by definition or tautology. It resembles
the circular claim that a soporific condition causes one to be sleepy.
To escape the charge of tautology, we have to be able to isolate
the cause from its effects. We have to be able to perceive the
soporific condition independently of the person's being sleepy. Since
it is hard to imagine being sleepy without being in a soporific con• Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.A. University of California
at Berkeley; J.D. University of Chicago, 1964: M.C.C. University of Chicago, 1965. This
paper was prepared in conjunction with Professor Fletcher's appearance at Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, to deliver the Harold J. Siebenthaler
Lecture.
1. 0. HOLMES. THE COMMON LAW l (1881).
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dition or being in a soporific condition without being sleepy, we
can readily label this connection as circular and therefore
tautological. Because they are true by definition, tautologies do
not tell us anything about the real world. They are merely the
expression of verbal interdependencies.
Those who claim that economic and social circumstances generate
the superstructure of the law obviously believe that these social
and economic circumstances can be identified independently of the
legal institutions they generate. It is not so easy, however, to know
whether a particular resource is important or whether a particular
requirement is a "felt necessity of the time" 2 without looking at
legal institutions. In many situations, the perception of the base
collapses into our perception of the superstructure. There is often
no way of perceiving social values without looking at legal
institutions.
Take the question whether human life is important in the United
States today. We claim that human life is important, certainly much
more important than property, but if we take a close look at our
legal institutions we might wonder whether this is true. We need
only note the dominant attitude in the United States toward capital
punishment, toward abortion, toward the use of the automobile
as our primary means of transportation. The primary evidence for
assessing the value of human life in the United States today is
indeed. the law itself. Of course the legal institutions themselves
are complex and there are contrary strains within the legal decisions themselves that reflect a greater concern for human life.
Witness the increase in liability against bar keepers and social hosts
who serve drinks to obviously drunk patrons and guests. 8 These
rules are designed to protect the innocent against drunk drivers.
Let me be clear about my claim. I am not arguing either that
there is a high or low regard for human life in the United States,
but rather that it is difficult to perceive what our attitude is without
looking at the legal decisions that we make. If the consequence,
namely the law itself, is the best evidence available for the felt
necessities of our time, then it becomes tautological to claim that
the social and economic needs generate legal institutions. When
the cause collapses into the consequence, we have a logical pro-

2. Id.
3. See Kelly v. Guinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
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position comparable to the claim that a soporific condition brings
about sleepiness.
There are obviously some cases in which social and economic
upheaval induce significant legal changes. It is not particularly difficult to trace the impact of the Depression on Supreme Court decisions upholding interventions in the economy. Without attempting
to assess the precise ways in which social and economic circumstances can induce a legal change, I should like to shift the
focus of our thinking about law away from causal explanations
toward an understanding of legal phenomena as the expression
of meaning. The question that may prove to be more illuminating
is not how did we get to where we are, but rather: What do the
details of our legal system say about who we are? This is an important shift in orientation - from tracing events back to their
causes to reading legal decisions as carrying implicit messages.
To follow through on the example of sleepiness, let us suppose
that a lecturer confronts widespread yawning in his audience. He
can ask himself a number of different questions. He can ask the
causal question: What are the physiological circumstances that induce yawning? He can answer that causal question tautologically
by saying that a soporific condition induces signs of sleepiness or
he can answer the question by pointing to independent causal factors, such as the lateness of the hour or the lecture hall's being
overheated. Another approach, the one that I favor in this lecture,
stresses the yawning as an expression of meaning. What is the
yawning person trying to tell the lecturer? The meaning of the
yawn is sometimes painfully obvious.
In this lecture I should like to encourage an attitude toward
legal phenomena that stresses both tradition and change as an expression of meaning, particularly as an expression of national legal
identity. I will illustrate this thesis with some specific examples
of substantive rules in American and in German law. In the latter
part of the lecture, I shall turn to the choice of language as a parallel
expression of identity within a particular legal system.
Allow me to begin with an example from the case law on the
admissibility of involuntary confessions. We are all familiar with
the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona,' which extended
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to station4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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house interrogations in the absence of counsel. The critical case
in the evolution of the law is, in my opinion, Rogers v. Richmond,5
decided in 1961, five years before Miranda. In this case, Justice
Frankfurter transformed the rationale for excluding involuntary
confessions. The true reasons for excluding involuntary confessions,
Frankfurter wrote, was not "because such confessions are unlikely
to be true but because the methods used ... offend an underlying
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law."6 The question,
of course, is what this underlying principle is if it is not conviction
of the guilty and avoiding conviction of the innocent. In
Frankfurter's statement of the principle, we find an expression
of Americari identity. The important point, Frankfurter wrote, was
that "ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by its own coercion
prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth." 7
The important feature of this argument is not whether the
learned Frankfurter was correct about the essence of accusatorial
or inquisitorial trials. He and his colleagues on the Supreme Court
had an image - a screen memory, if you _will - of medieval European inquisitorial trials. The nature of these trials was that the
trier of fact sought to procure confessions as the means of
establishing guilt. In the system of legal proof that prevailed on
the Continent prior to the French revolution,8 it was important
to secure confessions in cases where the formal rules of evidence
would not permit a conviction. The evil in this procedure, as the
Court perceived it, would extend to modern European accusatorial
procedure. It makes little difference whether the inquisitorial judge
seeks the confession or whether the independent prosecutor, functioning in an accusatorial system, seeks to gain incriminating
evidence from the mouth of the accused. It makes little .difference
whether torture is used or not. The essential evil is the state's
making an informal determination that there is sufficient evidence
in the case to clinch the prosecution with a. confession from the
mouth of the accused. With this argument taken as a premise, it

5. 365 U.S. 534 (19611.
6. Id. at 541.
7. Id.
8. See A. ESMEIN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 251-71, 288-322, App. B
(Simpson trans. 1913).
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was but a short step to the Court's ruling in Miranda that any
interrogation of a suspect in custody in the absence of counsel or
a knowing and explicit waiver of counsel is unconstitutional.
For our purposes, the intriguing issue is not so much the merit
of the Courfs reasoning, but the role of the argument for an affirmation of identity. To reason as did Mr. Justice Frankfurter is
to make a claim about what it means to be an American. Of course,
there is an obvious paradox in arguments of this sort - for if
it were truly the American way not to rely on confessions, there
would be no need to resolve cases like Rogers v. Richmond. The
argument about the American way is not an empirical claim about
what the police do in fact. It is a claim about the essence of the
American system of justice, not- about its historical particulars.
If the particulars of history belie the claim about the American
system, so much worse for the particulars. They will pass as do
all transient facts of history. Frankfurter's argument in Rogers v.
Richmond can be buttressed with arguments of principle and of
policy, of justice and of utility, but at its core it is an argument
of a different sort. Claims of principle should appeal to all judges
graced with reason and a sense of justice. Arguments of policy
should appeal to all people concerned about social welfare. Yet
Frankfurter's argument can appeal only to Americans and others
who share the same historical experience. When a judge reasons
that a particular decision is compelled by "our" system of criminal
justice, his claim speaks only to those who identify with us and
our system for trying criminals.
This style of reasoning is found in Continental jurisdictions as
well as in the United States Supreme Court. Of course, the areas
of law that express the affirmation of identity might well differ.
A good example from the German case law is a 1951 decision of
the Supreme Court in Criminal Cases.9 A German national, who
had been reared in the Balkans and could neither read nor write
German, was charged with incest for having had an illicit sexual
relationship with his 17-year,old step-daughter. The sexual union
was in fact prohibited under German law,1° but the defendant
claimed that because he came from a different cultural background,
he did not know that sleeping with his step-daughter was legally

9. Decision of the Supreme Court in Criminal Cases, December 6, 1956, 10 BGHSt. 35.
10. StGB § 173.
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incestuous. Under German law, he could in fact make out a complete excuse of mistake of law if he could establish that his mistake
about the violation was free from fault. 11 In view of the apparently
different conceptions of incest, the defendant could plausibly argue
that his ignorance of wrongdoing was unavoidable and therefore
morally innocent.
The trial court convicted the defendant of incest on the theory
that the same act of intercourse also constituted the criminal violations of adultery and of sexual exploitation of a dependant minor.
He should have been aware, therefore, that he was engaged in
wrongful sexual behavior. If this awareness of wrongdoing could
be transferred from one crime to another, then it could plausibly
be said that the defendant also ·knew that his incest was wrong.
He was aware, generally, that the sexual act was both morally
wrong and a violation of law. He was mistaken, simply, about
whether the act constituted incest as well as other forms of sexual wrongdoing.
Transferring culpability from one crime to another is common
in the Anglo-American tradition. The theory of transferred malice
generates the felony murder rule, which takes the intent to commit an independent felony to be sufficient to convict of murder
for killings occurring in the course of the felony .12 The German
Supreme Court was fully aware that the trial court in this case
relied on a theory that closely resembled Anglo-American doctrine.
The German court rejected the American approach on the grounds
that it was philosophically primitive. As the court reasoned: "German doctrine has overcome earlier theories which still prevail in
Anglo-American jurisdictions, according to which it is sufficient
if the actor's intention is to commit any offense, regardless whether
he intends to violate the specific legal interests that .are actually
violated." 13 Later in the opinion, the court bolstered its sense of
being different from the Americans. Responding to a writer who
urged that culpability could be transferred from one offense to
another, the court quoted the distinguished philosopher Gustav
Radbruch as saying, "It is but a short step from this view to the
Anglo-American conception of intention and the prin~iple of strict
liability ...." 14 Recoiling against this possibility, the court revers11.
12.
13.
14.

StGB § 17.
See generally G. FLETCHER,
10 BGHSt. at 39.
Id. at 40.

RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW

282-84 (1978).
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ed the conviction for incest and developed the argument that the
required awareness of wrongdoing must relate to the specific crime
charged.
There is no doubt that German jurists take the theory of criminal
accountability more seriously than do their Anglo-American
counterparts. A revulsion against strict liability, against felonymurder, against utilitarianism, against Angl~American insensitivity
to the problems of just punishment - all of these are part of what
it means to be a German criminal lawyer. 15 German theorists invest extraordinary passion and a commitment to the refinement
of substantive legal theory. Identifying with this edifice of principles and its immanent structure of values is a form of selfaffirmation, precisely as identifying with the American system of
criminal prosecution is an act of self-affirmation for American
criminal lawyers.
Comparing this German case on mistake of law with Rogers v.
Richmond, we should note a common feature of the process of selfaffirmation in the legal decision-making. Both arguments build on
a strong sense of the difference between self and others. In one
case, the "other" is the European tradition with its inquisitorial
mode of trial; in the German case, the feared "other" is the
pragmatic American with his insensitivity to substantive criminal
justice. I am not able to say whether the development of self in
social interaction requires a comparable sense of superiority related
to others, yet in the law, this attitude toward foreign systems appears to be an important feature of the process of discovering and
defending the national spirit of a legal system.
This sense of superiority in the expression of legal identity is
found not only in cross-cultural comparison, but in temporal comparisons drawn with a view to gaining distance from evils in one's
own history. One of the stock arguments of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence is that particular institutions are tainted
by association with the special procedures of the sixteenth century Star Chamber. The latest example is the Supreme Court's
opinion in Faretta v. California, 18 which holds that, even in serious
criminal cases, a defendant has the constitutional right to reject

15. For further elaboration of these premises of German legal thought, see Fletcher,
The Right and the Reasonab/,e, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985).
16. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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counsel and proceed in prO'J)'ria persona. This is a holding that most
German lawyers would regard as ill-informed, if not mad. Indeed,
the Supreme Court musters few arguments for its view that our
conception of human dignity requires that a criminal defendant
be able to stand and fall on his own. Yet we do have the experience
of the Star Chamber, which - at least according to the Supreme
Court - used the institution of obligatory representation to
enhance its persecution of criminal defendants. 17 Reacting in part
to this screen memory, the Court could conclude that having or
not having a lawyer is a tactical decision that every criminal defendant should be free to make.
If the Star Chamber can have this impact after three centuries,
one can imagine the contemporary uneasiness in West Germany
with the living memory of National Socialist criminal justice. It
is no accident that the West German Basic Law accentuates values
such as the right to life, 18 human dignity, 19 the free expression of
personality,211 the equality of the sexes as well as of all races, ethnic
groups, and religions. 21 The organicist positivism of the National
Socialist era led to a revival of natural law in the post-war period.
Overcoming the immediate past has been one of the preoccupations of German legal theory. In the field of protecting human life,
in particular, the ghosts of all those murdered by the Nazis will
haunt the administration of criminal justice for a long time to come.
The need to distance oneself from the evils of National Socialism
proved to be one of the major determinants of a recent decision
by the Federal Constitutional Court22 to invalidate a 1974 abortion law that permitted all abortions during the first twelve weeks
of pregnancy. What is required under Roe v. W ade28 turns out to
be constitutionally prohibited in West Germany. The court is fully
aware that its decision departs from the trend in the United States
as well as other countries in Western Europe. Yet by the court's
own admission, it is "the historical experience and the moral,
humanistic confrontation with National Socialism" that makes a
difference in Germany.24 Germans are not free to decide the abor17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 821-22.
GG art. 2(2).
GG art. 1.
GG art. 2(1).
GG art. 3.
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court, February 25, 1975, 39 BVerf E. 1.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See supra note 22, at 67.
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tion question as are other countries. The imperative to express
a self different from that of National Socialists impels a decision
at odds with the emergent Western toleration for abortion on demand in the early stages of pregnancy.
The problem with all arguments based on a reaction either to
a foreign system or to a foreign past is that so much depends on
how one perceives the alien experience. The fact is that the National Socialists developed a policy against, not in favor of, abortion; their concern was not so much the instrinsic value of the fetus,
but the strengthening of the German Volk. This point is brought
out effectively by the two judges dissenting from the ruling of
the Constitutional Court.25 In view of these alternative readings
of the Third Reich, one wonders about this process of selfaffirmation in developing basic constitutional norms. There is an
irrational element in lawmaking by distancing oneself from the
past, and this irrationality is compounded by the inevitable disputes
about the evil reacted against. With all these difficulties, however,
there is no denying the critical role of self-affirmation in the evaluation of legal systems.
In the second part of this lecture, I should like to turn to the
language of law as another vehicle for expressing the cultural identity of legal systems. Lawyers become attached, more than they
realize, to particular phrases and doctrinal expressions as the means
by which they affirm their cultural identity. The most striking example that comes to mind is the pervasive reliance on the term
"reasonable" in the common law system. We routinely refer to
"reasonable time," "reasonable delay," "reasonable reliance," and
"reasonable care." In criminal law, we talk incessantly of
"reasonable provocation," ''reasonable mistake," "reasonable force,"
and "reasonable risk." In the variety of usage and diversity of doctrinal context, there is probably no term used more ubiquitously
in the language of common law.
The pervasiveness of reasonableness in our discourse would
hardly warrant notice if all legal systems relied, similarly, upon
the concept of reason to express a central commitment of their
culture. The fact is, however, that the language of the common
law differs in this respect from every legal language with which
I am familiar. French, German, and Soviet lawyers, for example,
manage to make out legal arguments without relying upon
25. Id. at 68.

210

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13/201

derivatives of the concept of reason. Their languages have a term
for reason - raison, Vernu?'ifl, razumnost' - and these terms readily yield corresponding adjectives. Yet these parallels to our term
"reasonable" do not figure prominently in legal speech on the continent. The French civil code uses the term raisonnabl,e precisely
once;28 the German and Soviet civil codes do not use the term at
all. You can read the criminal codes of these various countries in
vain in search of a term based upon the concept of reason. It is
hard to imagine how these diverse legal cultures could conceptualize
negligence without talking about reasonable care, but they manage
to do so just fine. 27 It is hard to imagine how they could talk about
proof of guilt without invoking a phrase comparable to proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Yet French, German and Soviet
lawyers manage quite satisfactorily to express the requirements
of conviction without invoking terms akin to "reasonable doubt."
These comparisons are not designed to suggest that our way
of speaking is better or worse than Continental European patterns
of discourse. My aim is simply to make us mindful that this is indeed the way we speak, and to suggest, further, that this way
of analyzing legal problems expresses our image of ourselves as
lawyers in the language of the common law. It is almost as though
we could not function if we did not rely so pervasively on the unifying cement of reasonableness. Just imagine for the moment that
the terms "reasonable" and "reasonableness" were banned from
our language. How could we go about talking about negligence,
about mistakes, about searches and seizures, and about proof of
guilt without this essential word? If the word were banned, we
would, no doubt, eventually find substitutes. But· as we learned
to speak differently about legal problems, we would invariably feel
the loss. We would lose a significant component of our identity
as common lawyers.
An anecdote might illustrate the importance of reasonableness
to thinking like a common lawyer. Biblical Hebrew, and until recently, modern Hebrew, which is still close in its vocabulary and
structure to Biblical Hebrew, lacked a term that could be readily
translated as "reason" or "reasonable." That this is so tells us a
great deal about the difference between Hebraic and Hellenistic

26. Code Civil § 1137.
.27. For further development of these points, see Fletcher, supra note 15, at 949-50.
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cultures. The centrality of human reason comes to us from the
Greeks and their philosophic aspirations. Hebraic culture relies
on practice - and less significantly on reason - as the source
of wisdom and understanding. 28 If we had to pick one word as the
translation of reason into Hebrew, it would presumably be the
esoteric term tvunah, which derives from the root that means
understanding. This is a term used to translate, for example, Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason.29 But the term is too high-brow to have
much of an impact on common speech.
The absence of a term for reason raised some difficulties for
the Imperial British who, in 1936, imposed a version of Stephen's
Model Criminal Code on their colonial subjects in Palestine. The
official draft of this 1936 criminal ordinance was in English, but
it was obviously necessary to translate the ordinance into Hebrew,
the language of the courts. As one would expect, the term
reasonable appears throughout the code. Translating the term must
have been a headache for the translators, for as I have suggested,
there was at that time no precise, readily understood equivalent
in modern Hebrew. The lawyers were unhappy. It would just not
do to have a legal system modeled after the English common law
that did not rely prominently on the term "reasonable." As I am
told by Shalev Ginossar, a former judge and professor emeritus
in Jerusalem, a group of lawyers of the infant state convened one
day in the justice department where they decided that something
had to be done to fill in the gap in their legal language. Israelis
in all walks of life were then making up terms to adapt Biblical
Hebrew to modern conditions. Why not make up a new term that
would become the Israeli legal equivalent of reasonableness? The
lawyers cast about their language and came up with the word savir
as the appropriate term to use every time an English lawyer says
reasonable. Thus a whole new set of phrases was fathered. It
became acceptable in Hebrew to speak about a mistake or a doubt
or grounds or a time that was savir or reasonable. The root for
the term savir does not mean reason, but rather "to think," "to
surmise," or "to have an opinion." Were it not for the artificial
designation of this term as the Hebrew equivalent of reasonable,
no one would come upon the use of savir as an adjective describ28. See generally Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, THE PORTABLE MATHEW ARNOLD 469,
557-573 (Viking ed. 1956).
29.

I.

KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.
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ing mistakes or grounds or the amount of care required not to
be negligent.
A curious thing has happened since the lawyers coined this expression and the new set of phrases came to be embedded in all
subsequent legislation. The word savir has moved from the artificial
language of legislation into the language spoken on the st~eets.
The appropriate way to ask whether a price is reasonable was once
to inquire whether the price is one that "presents itself to the
mind." Now the common phrase in spoken Hebrew is whether the
. price is savir.
Why was it so important for Israeli lawyers to coin a single term
that could be used every time the word reasonable is used in
English? One might say because it is more convenient to have a
single term instead of a number of different expressions. But this
answer presupposes that the speakers perceive the underlying
unity among these diverse expressions. In French, German, and
Soviet law, one similarly finds a variety of expressions used to
translate the term reasonable. 30 Lawyers in these systems do not
sense that the multiplicity of terms represents a fracturing of a
single concept; for them, the concepts are multiple rather than
variations on the same theme. Israeli lawyers responded differently
because they worked within a legal system that relied extensively on English materials, they all spoke English fluently or nearly
fluently, and they wanted to think of themselves as carrying forward the English common law. Coining a term and relying on that
term became a central expression of Israel's place in the family
of common law legal systems.
Reasonableness is not the only term in English that plays this
distinctive role. There are other usages that locate lawyers in the
orbit of those nurtured on English as their. legal language. Think
for a. minute about the term "policy." In discussing the law and
law reform, we rely heavily on this term. One of the firsi. cliches
that law students learn is the answer: "The court decided this way
as a matter of policy." We distinguish, seemingly, between the
positive law, which is enacted and fixed, and policy objectives, which
are unwritten but nonetheless em.bedded in our legal culture.
Various policies, such as deterrence in the criminal law, risk
distribution in the law of torts, and facilitating transactions in con30. See materials cited in Fletcher. supra note 15, at 950 nn. 2-8.
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tracts, seem to stand beyond the unseemly fray of politics. Yet
the terms policy and politics derive from the same root. By a stroke
that we would have to regard either as genius or self-deception,
the evolution of our language enabled us to think of policies as
clean and politics as dirty. Little do we realize, however, that
lawyers in other legal systems have a great deal of difficulty
understanding what we mean by policy and translating this term
into their language. They are stuck with only one word for both
policy and politics, and therefore they do not pick up the distinction between the clean and the dirty that we invest in this distinction. A term has crystallized in contemporary German usage that
enables legal theorists to distinguish between politics and policy,
but the term has an artificial ring. Theorists combine the term
for law with the term for politics, yielding rechtspolitisch, thus
distinguishing legal politics from ordinary politics.
Note the critical difference between our reliance on the term
reasonable and our· attachment to the distinction between policy
and politics. The term reasonable lends itself to translation in virtually every other Indo-European language. We choose to rely upon
the term reasonable, and lawyers in Europe choose the opposite.
In contrast, the very existence of the term policy distinguishes
our legal language. For European lawyers, the problem is not
whether they should invoke a term they already have, but whether
they should devise a term that captures what we mean when we
talk about policy.
English legal discourse is replete with technical terms, such as
"estoppel" and "consideration," that do not lend themselves readily to translation into other legal languages. When the terms are
expressed in Latin, as is the case with certiorari and habeus cor'JYUS, we can guess that translation into a foreign language will be
difficult; translation into English itself is a stumbling block. In some
of these cases, the difficulty of translation is simply an inevitable
fact of distinct linguistic experience.
Sometimes, however, the non-translatability of a term points to
a distinctive feature of our history or the structure of our legal
discourse. T·here is no way to translate t~e terms "equity" and
the equitable institution of the "trust" into European legal
languages for none of these systems recognizes the distinction between law and equity, between legal and equitable ownership. Of
course, there are analogues to the trust in various jurisdictions,
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but they are based upon concepts of contract, rather than the bifurcation of the property interest.81
The nontranslatability of policy is illuminating in a different way.
The term does not point to a special feature of historical experience,
but rather to a prominent feature in the structure of our discourse.
Why, indeed, have we cultivated the distinction between policies
that are beyond question and politics, the methods of which are
always subject to question? What need does the term policy fill
in our own language? I submit that one of the reasons we rely
so heavily on the concept of policy is that we lack a term in English
to express the notion of law as a set of unwritten, enduring principles binding upon us by virtue of their intrinsic merit. Blackstone
thought of the common law in this way, but in the course of the
nineteenth century our thinking about law became so heavily dependent upon judicial and legislative enactment that we have lost our
sense for law as an enduring body of principles. Europeans retain
the distinction between law as principle and law as enactment by
distinguishing in their language between two sets of terms for law.
In German the distinction is between Recht and Gesetz, in French
between le droit and la loi, in Spanish between el derecho and la
ley. Normative ideals of the legal system are expresssed by relying upon the first of these ordered pairs. The notion, for example,
of the rule of law is always expressed by choosing the term that
means law as a body of enduring principles, for example, as in
the terms Rechtstaat or la regle de droit. We lack a term for law
that points clearly to the higher dimensions of justice and order
that make the rule of law something more significant than the law
of rules. As a result, we rely heavily on policy as a surrogate expressing the higher dimensions of value in our thinking about
governing by law.
The pervasive influence of reasonableness on our legal culture
might also fill the gap left by the absence of a concept of Recht
or droit in our legal thinking. Both terms, policy and reasonableness,
are indisputably normative. The legislature can never say definitively what constitutes the guiding policies of our society, nor can
it ever specify what shall constitute reasonableness in a particular
context. These standards transcend the enacted, written legal
materials. They always require a judgment of value that goes
beyond what we read in the lawbooks.
31. See C. DE WULF, THE TRUST IN CIVIL
Civil Law").

LAW

27 (1965) (trust "without parallel in the
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My thesis is that our gravitating toward particular words and
concepts reflects our consciousness of being lawyers in the common law tradition. Unlike Israeli lawyers who chose to develop
a concept of reasonableness in their legal language, we use the
basic terms of our language without reflecting on the way in which
they make us different from lawyers in other traditions. We are
hardly aware that our pervasive reliance on reasonableness and
on policy says something about the structure of our thinking about
law. Perhaps this point shall count as a criticism of the general
argument that the choice of language expresses our national legal
identity. If the use of language is unwitting, if we are not aware
of the way in which our choice of words makes us distinctive, then
arguably the use of language does not serve the function of self
definition.
You will recall that the American rejection of the inquisitorial
system and our firm belief that everyone has a right to defend
himself, even in a capital case, self-consciously distinguishes us from
the European legal tradition. Similarly, the Germans' rejection of
strict liability in the criminal law self-consciously distinguishes them
from what they take to be the primitive features of Anglo-American
jurisprudence. The contemporary West German stand on abortion
self-consciously distinguishes them from what they take to be the
National Socialist attitude toward human life. All of these legal
positions serve to define the respective legal culture in contrast
to others.
The commitment to particular forms of language may serve this
function only if the commitment is self-conscious, that is, only if
the lawyers are aware that their mode of speaking is distinctive.
Of course, it is typically the case that lawyers self-consciously speak
differently from the lay public. This choice of a special lexicon fulfills
the need for differentiation from untutored lay people. This proposition holds clearly with respect to arcane Latin expressions,
yet not quite so clearly with regard to basic terms like
"reasonableness" and "policy."
In the field of comparative law, the study of language and·
language transplants proves to be essential in understanding the
self-definition of language systems. When the Japanese sought to
enter the Western legal world in the late nineteenth century, the
first thing they did was generate a whole new vocabulary in order
to talk about law in the way in which Europeans, particularly Germans, cast their arguments. Embarrassed by not having a word
for individual "rights" in their language, they created a new word
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- precisely as the Israelis created a new word to express the
concept of reasonableness. Also noting that they did not have a
vocabulary of abstract terms to talk about legal theory, the
Japanese translated wholesale a range of concepts that the Germans developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
After World War II, American influence was felt more strongly,
particularly in the drafting of the new Japanese constitution. Eager
to reflect American influence in their vocabulary, Japanese lawyers
· now talk about the constitutional issues of "due prosessu." The
conclusions that Japanese lawyers and judges draw from these
transplanted terms and concepts are probably not as important
as the commitment to this language as an expression of their attachment to Western jurisprudence.
In these examples, drawn from the Israeli and Japanese experience, I have stressed the translation of legal concepts as a way
of expressing adherence to a foreign tradition. We should not
underestimate, however, the power of language as a barrier between legal cultures. This is most noticeably the case in those
jurisdictions, such as Quebec and South Africa, where the conflict
between the common law and the civil law is expressed, as well,
as a linguistic conflict. In both of these cases, the common law
· is expressed in English; French and Dutch are reserved for expressing civilian legal ideas. Without this difference in language,
I would submit that the common law and civil law traditions would
quickly amalgamate. My sense is that in Louisiana, which no longer
has the French language as an anchor for the civilian tradition,
the fusion of the two legal cultures is inevitable. The differences
between case law and codification tends to disappear in every
developed legal system. But differences anchored in a different
idiom and a different mode of self-expression endure despite virtually every form of social and economic change.
What is the moral status of these arguments expressing cultural
identity in law-making? How do they rank with arguments of
justice? Of principle and policy? Of efficiency? Are they, in any
sense, moral arguments? As detached observers of our own and
foreign legal systems, we can readily identify these arguments as
frequent occurrences. As participants in legal debate, however, we
should have serious reservations about seeking to affirm ourselves
- or to affirm what we think our tradition has made us - in solving serious conflicts, such as the asserted right to an abortion, the
asserted right to represent oneself in a felony trial, and the issues
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of culpability and strict liability in the criminal law. All legal traditions as well as our identity within those traditions vacillate in
flux. Solving a problem by self-affirmation renders our moral judgment hostage to a self-serving perception of the past. We should
indeed turn the inquiry around. We should constantly test our tradition for its principled soundness. The life of the law may be experience, but our experience rings hollow unless tested, in every
decision, against the_ rule of reason.

